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INTRODUCTION
Material objects, such as tables and chairs, have an intimate relationship
with space. They have to be somewhere. They must possess an address at
which they are found. Under this aspect, they are in good company. Events,
too, such as Caesar’s death and John’s buttering of the toast, and m re
elusive entities, such as the surface of the table, have an address, difficult as
it may be to specify. A stronger notion presents itself, though. Some entities
may not only be located at an address; they may also own (as it were) the
place at which they are located, so as to exclude other entities from being
located at the same address. Thus, for certain kinds of entities, no two
tokens of the same kind can be located at the same place at the same time.
This is typically the case with material objects. Likewise, no two par-
ticularized properties of the same level or degree of determinacy can be lo-
cated at the same place at the same time (although particularized properties of
different degree, such as the red of this table and the color of this table,
can). Other entities seem to evade the restriction. Two events can be per-
fectly co-located without competing for their address. Or, to use a different
terminology, events do not ccupy the spatial region at which they are lo-
cated, and can therefore share it with other events. The rotation of the Earth
and the cooling down of the Earth take place at exactly the same region.
Some of these facts and hypotheses have important bearings as to
matters of identity. For instance, co-localization seems to be a sufficient
condition for identity in the case of material objects, but not in the case of
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events. That entities of different kind have different relations to space is in
itself an interesting state of affairs. But other philosophical questions—at a
deeper level—are worth exploring. What are the relationships between an
entity and the space at which it is located? What is the metaphysical structure
of localization? What its modal status? What follows is an attempt to address
some of these questions and to work out at least the main coordinates of the
logical structure of localization. We shall also highlight some of the main
interactions between the notion of localization and other notions in nearby
areas, such as the notions of part and whole. Among other things, this will
enable us to show that neither mereology nor topology, taken alone or
jointly, permit an adequate representation of some very basic spatial struc-
tures: the notion of spatial localization deserves an independent place in spa-
tial representation. In the long run, this is bound to tie in with some highly
controversial metaphysical issues concerning the true nature of space, and
particularly the dispute between absolutistic and relational conceptions.
Here, however, we shall try to remain neutral with respect to such issues.
We shall follow common sense in distinguishing between an entity and “its”
region of space, but we shall avoid any commitment as to the ultimate onto-
logical status of the latter.
HAVING AN ADDRESS
Spatial things are spatial insofar as they cannot but be somewhere. That is to
say, it must be possible to assign them an address of some sort. People have
addresses, and by extension every mat ial object can be assigned an
address. These addresses, in turn, may induce an address assignment to
whatever events may involve people and other objects. Numbers and sets (at
least the empty set) are by contrast addressless.
Elementary as it might be, the notion of an address involves intricacies
that bear witness to the complexity of localization. We can distinguish, to
begin with, a dispositional and an actual, non-dispositional notion of ad-
dress. John lives in Manhattan, and even if he drives somewhere outside the
Big Apple, he still retains an address there. This is the customary notion of
an address. It is intrinsically dispositional, and is partly grounded in non-
spatial facts, such as conventions, or communicative intentions in general.
By contrast, when John travels from Manhattan to Paris, or simply takes a
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walk in Manhattan, his actual address changes. He may very well retain his
dispositional address, but as a matter of fact he is now somewhere else than
he was before he started travelling or walking. This may be a slight depar-
ture from the ordinary notion of an address, but the extension is obvious.
(Think of the taxi-driver asking for John’s address when John is calling
from a restaurant.)
On a different line, we may further distinguish a spatially minimal and
a broader, non-minimal notion of an address. Every timeJohn moves
(including when he only moves, expands, or contracts parts of his body),
his minimal address changes. This holds clearly in the non-dispositional
sense, and can be extended to the dispositional sense. On the other hand,
John may move around Manhattan and still be in Manhattan. His moving
does not necessarily carry along a change in his address, if this is under-
stood in a broad sense. (This may well be a matter of focus. Think of an
astronaut specifying the position of John.)
A third classificatory criterion draws upon the semantic structure of the
singular terms used for denoting addresses. Spatially unstructured terms
include proper names of addresses or definite descriptions whose semantic
complexity is not spatially relevant. Consider, respectively, ‘John lives in
Manhattan’ and ‘John lives in the Empire State Building’, or ‘John lives in
the most expensive building of all’. Sp tially structured terms are ither
proper names or definite descriptions whose semantic omponents are
overtly spatial. The interesting cases are provided here by coordinate sys-
tems or street numberings: ‘John is at 40° North (of the Equator) and 74°
West (of Greenwich)’; ‘He is at 5th Avenue and 34th Street’; ‘He is at 77
5th Avenue’.
Address terms may also be used projectively, so to speak. For in-
stance, the address of a fly at a certain time might be given in terms of the
fly’s projection on the squares of a chess board: ‘The fly is now at b7’.
These and similar cases, however, when the address name makes reference
to a place that is not the place wher  the object is really located (either
actually or dispositionally), need ot be of our concern here. Also, for
simplicity we shall ignore the case of indexical spatial expressions such as
‘here’ or ‘three feet from there’, or of any other expression that essentially
involves a viewpoint, such as ‘to your right’ or ‘behind the Empire State
Building’.
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BEING LOCATED
One understands addresses in the dispositional sense in terms of the actual
notion of an address: to have a dispositional address  impli  having the
possibility of actually (non-dispositionally) being at a . To systematize the
actual notion of an address (the address you have when you are where you
are), it is convenient to rely on the spatially minimal notion of an address.
This, in fact, is sure to be common to whatever actual address you might
have. Your actual, spatially minimal address gives your exact localization.
The exact localization of an object is the region of space taken up by the
object (modulo any worries as to whether the boundary belongs to the object
or to the complement, or indeed whether the object has an exact boundary).
Thus, John is not exactly located in Manhattan, but he is exactly located in
the space “carved out” of the air, or of whatever medium he might be in
(water, if he is swimming; concrete, if he was nasty to his godfather). This
notion of exact localization thus requires that spatial regions be included in
the prima facie ontology (although, as we mentioned, we want to remain
neutral with respect to their ultimate ontological status). Indeed, in a prelimi-
nary characterization, (exact) localization is a relation whose second term is
always a region of space. Even if we can talk of John’s being located in a
column in the basement of his godfather’s country house, this would not be
the sense in which we are using the term here. Instead, John would be lo-
cated in a space carved inside that column. On the other hand, the first term
of the localization relation can be whichever sort of entity you have in your
spatial ontology—spatial regions included. We can speak of John’s being
located at region r; but we can also speak of John’s body, of the sum of his
present intradermal events, or even of region r itself being located at r.
Note that reference to exact localization has the derivative (but not neg-
ligible) advantage of inhibiting all issues of vagueness: no matter how vague
the boundary of an object is—if you allow for vague boundaries at all—the
spatial region at which the object is exactly located is perfectly determinate
(relative to the object).
PRINCIPLES OF LOCALIZATION
In terms of exact localization, assumed as a primitive relation, we can begin
to unfold a more detailed picture of locative relations by exploiting the part–
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whole structure of spatial entities. As a matter of fact, regions of space form
a mereologically well-behaved structure—a prime example of a domain or-
dered by the part of relation. We shall assume the same to hold for every
spatial entity, i.e., for whatever sort of entity can be located at a region of
space. In doing so, we shall ignore the difficulties arising from the consid-
eration of tensed part–whole principles, and we shall presume that standard
extensional mereology—as rooted in the work of Les;´ niewski [1916] or
Leonard and Goodman [1940]— will fit the purpose 1. That is, let ‘P’ sym-
bolize parthood (proper or improper), and let ‘O’ be the overlap relation,
defined as usual as sharing of a common part:
DP1 O(x, y) =df $ z(P(z, x) Ù  P(z, y)).
Then, the part–whole theory that we shall assume is given by the following
two axioms:
AP1 P(x, y) « " z(O(z, x) ®  O(z, y))
AP2 $ x(f (x)) ®  $ x" y(O(x, y) «  $ z(f (z) Ù O(z, y))).
By AP1, parthood amounts to inclusion of overlappers: this ensures that P
is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive (a partial ordering) whereas O is
reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive. By AP2, every satisfied condi-
tion f  picks out an entity consisting of all and only those things that satisfy
f . We assume no restriction on the existence of such mereological sums,
regardless of whether they are homogeneous and spatially connected.
Among other things, these principles guarantee that parthood satisfies a
supplementation principle to the effect that if an object has a proper part, it
has a second part disjoint from the former:
TP1 PP(x, y) ®  $ z(P(z, y) Ù  Ø O(z, x)),
where ‘PP’ (proper parthood) is defined in the obvious way:
DP2 PP(x, y) =df P(x, y) Ù  Ø P(y, x).
In addition, we assume reciprocal parthood to be tantamount to identity:
DP3 x=y =df P(x, y) Ù  P(y, x),
which we take to be governed by the usual axioms. By TP1, this implies
extensionality: no two non-atomic entities can have exactly the same proper
parts.
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On these grounds, we can now articulate a minimal theory of localiza-
tion based on a specific primitive, say ‘L’. Intuitively, as we said, we want
this to express the relation of exact localization, so that ‘L(x, y)’ will read ‘x
is exactly located at y’. However, with the help of mereology we can im-
mediately expand the set of available locative relations by saying that x is
wholly located (WL) at y just in case x is located at some part of y; x is
partly located (PL) at y just in case some part of x is located at y; and x is
generically located (GL) at y just in case some part of x is located at some
part of y:
DL1 WL(x, y) =df $ z(P(z, y) Ù  L(x, z)).
DL2 PL(x, y) =df $ z(P(z, x) Ù  L(z, y)).
DL3 GL(x, y) =df $ z$ w(P(z, x) Ù  P(w, y) Ù  L(z, w)).
Thus, exact localization is a special case of a more general notion of local-
ization: within certain obvious limits, if ‘L’ expresses the notion of minimal
address, ‘WL’ corresponds to the wider, non-minimal notion (John is
wholly located in Manhattan), ‘PL’ to its dual (Manhattan is partly located at
the region occupied by John), and ‘GL’ to the general case. This is some-
what captured by the following immediate consequences of DL1–DL3:
TL1 L(x, y) ®  WL(x, y) Ù  PL(x, y)
TL2 WL(x, y) Ú  PL(x, y) ®  GL(x, y)
(The converse of TL1 also holds, but not that of TL2: 96th Street is generi-
cally—but neither wholly nor partly—located at the region occupied by
Central Park.)
By way of illustration, consider a cross-shaped region x, its overlap-
ping bars y and z, and their common part w. Then we have, inter alia:
WL(y, x), WL(w, y), PL(x, y), PL(y, w), GL(x, y), GL(y, x), GL(y, z),
and GL(z, y).
 y
z
w
x
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Of course, in a domain comprising only regions of space (so that both ar-
guments of the L-relation range over entities of the same kind), the concep-
tual cluster of localization collapses onto plain mereology via the transforms
L(x, y) Û x=y, WL(x, y) Û P(x, y), PL(x, y) Û P(y, x), and GL(x, y)
Û O(x, y). In general, however, this is not the case, as there is more to the
ontology of localization than just spatial regions. (Here, and in the follow-
ing, we are speaking of spatial regions in a very general fashion, so as to
include three-dimensional, voluminous regions as well as points and other
boundary-like elements. Correspondingly, our general domain of discourse
may include, next to three-dimensional bodies, also entities of f wer di-
mensions. It would also be interesting, albeit beyond our present purposes,
to see whether and to what extent the theory of temporal and spatio-temporal
localization can be obtained from the theory of spatial localization by simply
exploiting the intuition of time as a fourth dimension.)
Turning now to the specific axioms for ‘L’, the following set consti-
tutes a minimal requirement (further postulates will be considered in the next
sections):
AL1 L(x, y) Ù  L(x, z) ®  y=z
AL2 L(x, y) Ù  P(z, x) ®  WL(z, y)
AL3 L(x, y) Ù  P(z, y) ®  PL(x, z)
AL4 L(x, y) ®  L(y, y).
Axiom AL1 is a sort of extensionality principle, to the effect at a
single entity cannot be exactly located at two distinct regions (hence, in par-
ticular, two distinct regions cannot be exactly co-located): L is a functional
relation AL2 and AL3 fix the intuitive bridge from the theory of localization
to its mereological background: if x is exactly located at y, then every part of
x is wholly located at y, and x is partly located at every part of y. This en-
sures the following patterns of monotonicity:
TL3 WL(x, y) Ù P(z, x) ®  WL(z, y)
TL4 WL(x, y) Ù P(y, z) ®  WL(x, z) provided L(z, z)
TL5 PL(x, y) Ù P(z, y) ®  PL(x, z)
TL6 PL(x, y) Ù P(x, z) ®  PL(z, y)
TL7 GL(x, y) Ù P(y, z) ®  GL(x, z) provided L(z, z)
TL8 GL(x, y) Ù P(x, z) ®  GL(z, y).
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As for AL4, it guarantees that L behave as a reflexive relation whenever it
can: all (and only) those things at which something is located—i.e., on the
intended interpretation, all spatial regions—are located at themselves. Thus,
although we are not assuming that everything is located somewhere (which
would be a way of characterizing a world inhabited exclusively by spatial
entities), we want to ensure that this holds at least of all regions. Con-
versely, note that we are not assuming here that every region is the region of
something, i.e., a region at which something is located—except for the re-
gion itself. A region may be empty. We’ll come back to this shortly.
From AL1–AL3, using DL1–DL3, we can see first of all that the
choice of ‘L’ as a primitive for localization is formally unbiased (as it should
be): any one of the other three relations would do, as per the following
equivalences:
TL9 L(x, y) «  " z(P(z, x) ®  WL(z, y))
TL10 L(x, y) «  " z(P(z, y) ®  PL(x, z))
TL11 L(x, y) «  " z(O(z, x) ®  GL(z, y))
or also:
TL12 L(x, y) «  " z(WL(x, z) « WL(y, z))
TL13 L(x, y) «  " z(PL(y, z) «  PL(x, z))
TL14 L(x, y) «  " z(GL(y, z) «  GL(x, z)).
Moreover, the following consequences of AL1–AL3 show that reference to
DL1–DL3 is actually only one among a number of equivalent ways of intro-
ducing the three derived relations in terms of ‘L’:
TL15 WL(x, y) « $ z(P(x, z) Ù  L(z, y))
TL16 PL(x, y) « $ z(P(y, z) Ù  L(x, z))
TL17 GL(x, y) « $ z(O(x, z) Ù  L(z, y))
TL18 GL(x, y) « $ z(O(y, z) Ù  L(x, z)).
The basic picture of logical relationships among localization and parthood
relations is then completed by the following corollaries:
TL19 WL(x, y) « " z(O(x, z) ®  GL(z, y))
TL20 WL(x, y) «  " z(GL(x, z) ®  GL(y, z))
TL21 PL(x, y) « " z(GL(x, z) ®  O(z, y))
TL22 PL(x, y) «  " z(GL(y, z) ®  GL(x, z))
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TL23 GL(x, y) « $ z(P(x, z) Ù  PL(z, y))
TL24 GL(x, y) « $ z(P(z, x) Ù  WL(z, y)).
All of these, as we said, follow directly from AL1–AL3. Using also
AL4 we ensure further that L is both antisymmetric and transitive:
TL25 L(x, y) Ù  L(y, x) ®  x=y
TL26 L(x, y) Ù  L(y, z) ®  L(x, z).
Since L is reflexive on all regions, relative to the sub-domain of regions ex-
act localization is therefore a well-behaved partial ordering. Little inspection
then shows that the same also holds of complete as well as of partial local-
ization:
TL27 WL(x, y) Ù  WL(y, x) ®  x=y
TL28 WL(x, y) Ù  WL(y, z) ®  WL(x, z)
TL29 PL(x, y) Ù  PL(y, x) ®  x=y
TL30 PL(x, y) Ù  PL(y, z) ®  PL(x, z).
By contrast, general localization is neither transitive nor antisymmetric. The
best we can say is that it is reflexive and symmetric among regions—but this
is obvious: with respect to regions, general localization is neither more nor
less than mereological overlap.
REGIONS
We have seen that the limited reflexivity of L can be used to pick out a
defining property of spatial regions. Accordingly, we can define a ‘region’
predicate (R) by setting:
DL4 R(x) =df L(x, x).
Focusing now on this predicate, at least two more structural facts are worth
noting. First, AL4 together with AL3 make sure that being a spatial region is
a dissective property: regions have only regions as parts:
TL31 R(x) Ù  P(y, x) ® R(y).
Second, the property of being a spatial region is closed under (mereological)
product, in the sense that
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TL32 R(x) Ù  R(y) ® R(x´ y),
where
DP4 x´ y =df i z " w (P(w, z) «  P(w, x) Ù  P(w, y)).
This reflects an important sense in which spatial regions form a mereologi-
cally well-behaved domain. However, AL1–AL4 are not sufficient to ensure
that a similar fact extends to mereological sums. A domain built up from two
atomic regions x and y satisfies the axioms even if x+y is left out of the
extension of ‘R’. Hence, to do justice to the intuition that the sum of any
two regions is itself a region, we need to add a further, independent axiom:
AL5 R(x) Ù  R(y) ® R(x+y),
where
DP5 x+y =df i z " w (O(w, z) «  O(w, x) Ú  O(w, y)).
More generally, define the operator s  of general mereological fusion:
DP6 s x(f (x)) =df i z " w (O(w, z) «  $ y(f (y) Ù O(w, y))).
(By AP2, this exists whenever f  is a satisfied condition, and by AP1 + DP3
it is always unique.) Then AL5 may be strengthened so as to cover infinite
sums:
AL5' $ x(f (x)) Ù  " x(f (x) ®  R(x)) ®  R(s x(f (x))).
If there are frs, and if all f ers are regions, then putting them all together is
sure to give you a region. In particular, the sum of all regions is itself a re-
gion—the universal region. The rationale for AL5 and AL5' is, incidentally,
related to the fact that the ontological neutrality of the operation of mereolog-
ical sum cannot prevent regions from being part of hybrid sums, such as
John + John’s region. Thus, although for regions dissectivity is automati-
cally granted downwards (by TL31), closure under sum is independently
necessary for constructing regions out of component regions. TL31 says
that regions are necessary in order to build up regions mereologically; AL5'
ensures that they are sufficient.
Likewise, note that nothing in the axioms assumed so far implies that
spatial regions form a non-atomistic, dissective domain, in the sense that
every region has some proper part which is a region. If desired, that must
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also be added as a further independent axiom. More precisely, we can ex-
press the assumption that space is dissective downwards and/or upwards by
means of the following axioms, respectively:
AL6a R(x) ®  $ y(R(y) Ù  PP(y, x))
AL6b R(x) ®  $ y(R(y) Ù  PP(x, y)).
An even stronger axiom would be density: the mereological nesting of re-
gions always yields “remainders” that are themselves regions:
AL7 R(x) Ù  PP(y, x) ®  $ z(R(z) Ù  PP(z, x) Ù  Ø O(z, y)).
THE REGIONS OF THINGS
Consider again adding the postulate that every entity be located at some re-
gion. As we mentioned, this would obviously be very strong, and would
have drastic consequences for the ontology: every entity lacking spatial lo-
calization (such as the number 7, say) would be excluded from the domain.
Even so, it may be convenient, for the purpose of further investigating the
structure of spatial localization, to confine ourselves to such restricted do-
mains. If we are only talking about spatial entities, we may as well make
that explicit. Let us therefore make this additional assumption, at least pro-
visionally, and for methodological reasons:
AL8 $ y(L(x, y)).
Given any entity x, we can now speak of its region r(x)—the region of
space where x is located:
DL5 r(x) =df i y(L(x, y)).
The unicity of r(x) follows directly from the extensionality postulate, AL1.
(Thus, given the immediate consequence:
TL33 L(x, y) «  y = r(x),
in the presence of AL8 we could have defined ‘L’ in terms of ‘r’, taking the
latter as a primitive notion for the formal analysis of localization.) From
AL1, together with AL4, it follows further that r is idempotent and dis-
tributes over sums:
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TL34 r(r(x)) = r(x)
TL35 r(x+y) = r(x)+r(y),
whence       
TL36 r(x+y) = r(x+r(y)) = r(r(x)+y) = r(r(x)+r(y)).
That is, objects and their regions do not pile up to form other regions. By
contrast, the analogues for the operation of mereological product may not
hold unless the domain is restricted so as to include only regions. John and
r(John) have no parts in common, although obviously r(John) overlaps
r(John). In fact, note that if we confine ourselves to the domain of regions,
besides idempotence and distributivity we also have expansiveness:
TL37 R(x) ®  P(x, r(x)).
In view of TL34–TL36, this means that in the domain of regions the r op-
erator behaves as a closure operator satisfying the (mereologized version of)
the standard Kuratowski axioms for topological closure. However, this is
not very interesting in itself, since TL37 can of course be strengthened to:
TL38 R(x) ®  x=r(x),
which marks a complete collapse of the distinction between an entity and its
region. Not a surprise: the notion of an object’s region is of interest only
when the object is not itself a region.
On a different line, observe that the basic postulates for the localization
relation imply that mereological relations between things be mirrored by the
mereology of the corresponding regions:
TL39 P(x, y) ®  P(r(x), r(y))
TL40 O(x, y) ®  O(r(x), r(y)).
In fact, reference to regions allows us to draw a direct bridge from
mereology to localization:
TL41 P(x, y) ®  WL(x, r(y))
TL42 P(x, y) ®  PL(y, r(x))
TL43 O(x, y) ®  GL(x, r(y))
TL44 O(x, y) ®  GL(y, r(x)).
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These implications are trivial in case both x and y are spatial regions. In the
general case, however, TL41–TL44 highlight a fundamental pattern of in-
teraction between these two conceptual domains: mereological structure in-
duces a locative structure, but locative structure has no (immediate) conse-
quences on mereology. In particular, as it is to be expected, the converses of
TL41–TL44 do not generally hold. At most, we have the following:
TL45 WL(x, y) ® P(r(x), y)
TL46 PL(x, y) ®  P(y, r(x))
TL47 GL(x, y) ®  O(r(x), y)
TL48 GL(x, y) ®  O(y, r(x)).
In other words, locative structure induces a mereological structure (only) in
the corresponding domain of regions. (The converses of TL45–TL47 also
hold on the assumption that y be a region.)
ENTERING TOPOLOGY
One should not suppose that all regions are connected, or of a piece. Ar-
guably, if object x is scattered, r(x) will be. Now, this kind of general
principle cannot be formulated in terms of L and P only, and requires the
basic framework to be supplemented by a topological machinery of some
sort. More generally, the availability of topological notions makes it possible
to pick out topologically salient parts (interior part, tangential part) and
properties or relations (self-connectedness, separatedness, external connec-
tion) in terms of which peculiar patterns of spatial localization can be de-
fined. For example, we can say that an object x is internally (tangentially)
located at a region y if and only if x is located at some interior (tangential)
part of y.
Following in the footsteps of Whitehead [1929], this can be made pre-
cise along the following lines. Let us use ‘C’ for the basic topological rela-
tion of connection. This is to be understood in the standard topological
sense, modulo a mereological rather than set-theoretic framework. Intu-
itively, two things x and y are topologically connected just in case they ei-
ther overlap or abut each other (i.e., intuitively, just in case either x overlaps
the boundary of y or y overlaps the boundary of x). With this interpretation
in mind, we take ‘C’ to be governed by the following basic axioms:
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AC1 C(x,  x)
AC2 C(x,  y) ®  C(y,  x)
AC3 P(x,  y) ®  " z (C(z, x) ®  C(z, y)).
AC1+AC2 say that C is reflexive and symmetric, while AC3 guarantees that
connection be distributive over parthood.
Using ‘C’, other simple mereotopological notions are immediately de-
fined—e.g., external connection, tangential parthood, interior parthood:
DC1 EC(x,  y) =df C(x, y) Ù  Ø O(x, y)
DC2 TP(x,  y) =df P(x, y) Ù  $ z (EC(z, x) Ù  EC(z, y))
DC3 IP(x,  y) =df P(x, y) Ù  Ø TP(x,  y).
As is clear from DC1, all of these run afoul of plain mereology unless we
assume C to coincide with O. Even if we restrict ourselves to a domain of
regions, the possibility remains that two regions be only externally con-
nected, i.e., intuitively, connected only through a common boundary.
Let us stress that this account of ‘C’ is rather standard, in that it re-
duces to a standard mereotopology if the variables are restricted to the do-
main of spatial regions 2. Below we shall consider the possibility of pursu-
ing different interpretations; but, for the moment, let us focus on this simple
framework. Following the pattern of DL1–DL3, we can then refine the pic-
ture of localization relations in the desired way, by introducing correspond-
ing relations of external location, tangential whole/ p rtial location, and in-
ternal whole/partial location:
DL6 EL(x, y) =df $ z(EC(z, y) Ù  L(x, z))
DL7 TWL(x, y) =df $ z(TP(z, y) Ù  L(x, z))
DL8 TPL(x, y) =df $ z(TP(z, x) Ù  L(z, y))
DL9 IWL(x, y) =df $ z(IP(z, y) Ù  L(x, z))
DL10 IPL(x, y) =df $ z(IP(z, x) Ù  L(z, y)).
It is obvious that EL is not included in any of the relations available so far,
whereas TWL and IWL are special cases of WL, and TPL and IPL special
cases of PL. Thus, the basic features of localization expressed by TL1–TL2
can be supplemented by the following:
TL49 EL(x, y) ® Ø GL(x, y)
TL50 TWL(x, y) Ú IWL(x, y) ® WL(x, y)
TL51 TPL(x, y) Ú IPL(x, y) ® PL(x, y).
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By way of illustration, assuming for simplicity that w, x, y, and z are
all regions, in the following figure we have inter alia EL(x, y), TWL(z, y),
TPL(y, z), IWL(w, y), and IPL(y, w).
y
zx w
Again, this is somewhat trivial and reduces to pure mereotopology if we
confine ourselves to a domain of regions; but, as we shall see, the ful -
blown picture is much richer and presents several interesting features.
On this basis, the specific axioms relating ‘C’ and ‘L’ are essentially
five:
AL9 L(x, y) Ù  IP(z, x) ®  IWL(z, y)
AL10 L(x, y) Ù  IP(z, y) ®  IPL(x, z)
AL11 L(x, y) Ù  TP(z, x) ®  TWL(z, y)
AL12 L(x, y) Ù  TP(z, y) ®  TPL(x, z)
AL13 " z (C(z, x) ®  C(z, y)) ®  (R(x) ® P(x,  y)).
The first four of these are patterned after AL2–AL3 and simply extend to the
present case the basic relationships between L and the other relations of lo-
calization. In fact, AL2–AL3 are now derivable from AL9–AL12. More-
over, we can immediately infer facts analogous to TL3–TL8 and TL15–
TL24. For instance, we have:
TL52 IWL(x, y) Ù IP(z, x) ®  IWL(z, y)
TL53 IPL(x, y) Ù  TP(z, y) ®  IPL(x, z)
TL54 TWL(x, y) Ù TP(z, x) ®  TWL(z, y)
TL55 TPL(x, y) Ù TP(z, y) ®  TPL(x, z),
and so on. We also have the analogues of TL39–TL48. In particular, the
regions of connected entities are themselves connected:
TL56 C(x,  y) ®  C(r(x),  r(y)).
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(We leave it open for the moment whether the converse should also hold.)
As for AL13, it is a more substantial axiom: it says that the converse of AC3
holds too whenever the first argument of the parthood relation is a region.
This has the consequence of making parthood among regions characterizable
in terms of their connection relations, which in turn implies that C is exten-
sional among regions:
TL57 R(x) Ù  R(y) ®  (x=y « " z (C(z, x) «  C(z, y))).
Such a characterization is of course intuitive as long as regions form a dis-
sective domain, with no “atoms” (AL6a). Otherwise, to avoid the absurdity
that every atom x be part of its complement ~x, defined as
DP7 ~x =df s z (Ø O(z, x)),
it would be necessary to insert in the antecedent of AC5 the requirement that
x be non-atomic, i.e., $ z(PP(z,  x)).
At this point, we only need to establish the exact relationship between
‘C’ with the theory of localization. It is given by the following:
TL58 L(x,  y) « R(y) Ù  " z (C(z,  r(x)) «  C(z,  y)).
Thus, x is exactly located at y just in case y is a region that is connected ex-
actly to those things that are connected with the region of x. Likewise or the
other relations of localization.
We need not go any further into the formal details. The properties of
the topology-based r lations defined by DL6–DL10 are rather obvious,
given DC1–DC3, and in most cases they reflect corresponding properties of
the mereological structure in the background. Also, although the overall pic-
ture could still be extended in several ways, the philosophical import of such
extensions would be rather limited, and will not be pursued here.
CONNECTION, LOCALIZATION, AND PARTHOOD
We have three basic spatial relations now: connection (for topological as-
pects), parthood (for mereology), and localization. A number of facts high-
lighting the basic relationships among these notions have been listed. But
the general question of the mutual interdependence b tween topology,
mereology, and localization is still open: do we need all three of them, or
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can we dispense with some? In the domain of regions, localization reduces
to mereology by TL45–TL48, and mereology reduces to topology by AL13,
so only the latter is actually needed. This is in itself an important fact. But
what about the general case?
Surely, if the domain is not restricted to spatial regions, localization
does not reduce to and requires both mereology and topology. We have just
seen that. But suppose we start with topology instead. We have relied on a
standard interpretation of ‘C’, whereby two things are connected if they are
either overlapping or abutting. However, one might be tempted here to go
beyond such an accustomed interpretation and rely on a more general notion
of topological connection, so as to explain away localization in terms of the
resulting topological theory. If x is located at r(x)—one could argue—this
would be because x is connected with r(x). This is intriguing, but of course
it means little unless we can explain what this more general interpretation of
‘C’ looks like. In particular, what should the relevant notion of connection
between x and r(x) amount to? Overlap is excluded: an object does not share
parts with the region at which it is located—unless of course the object is it-
self a region, or a mereological sum including regions among other things.
Moreover, two objects can be partly or wholly co-located without sharing
any parts: if you put a stone inside a hole, the former does not become part
of the latter (and surely enough, if the stone fills the hole perfectly, it does
not become identical with e hole). Abutting is also excluded, if this is un-
derstood as the relation of external connection holding between contiguous
entities. To fix ideas, we must therefore think of the relevant relation as a
sort of internal connection. But this would take us into a circle. For what
kind of relation is this, if not a relation of localization? We face here an ap-
parent limit of topology as a general theory of space. Topology—and, more
generally, mereotopology—falls short of expressing one fundamental meta-
physical fact about space, namely embedding in space. The analysis situs
overlooks the fact that objects are si u ted.
This is not the whole story, though. For consider again TL56: if two
objects are connected, then so are their regions. Why not assuming the con-
verse as well? Why not regard connection of regions as a sufficient condi-
tion for connection of corresponding entities? This would mark an extension
of the standard interpretation of ‘C’. But it would be definite enough, and it
would strengthen the tie between localization and topology: If we read ‘C(x,
y)’ as ‘the region of x and the region of y are either overlapping or abutting’
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3, then localization s connection minus overlap minus abutting—or so one
could argue. For consider again x and its region, r(x). On the standard in-
terpretation of ‘C’ employed in the previous section, they are not connected.
But on the new interpretation at issue, they would be. Now, we just saw
that x and r(x) don’t overlap. And we don’t want to say that they are exter-
nally connected either. This would indeed follow from DC1, but if we
strengthen TL56 to a biconditional, the definition of ‘EC’ must obviously be
emended:
DC1' EC(x,  y) =df C(x, y) Ù  Ø O(r(x), r(y)).
(Otherwise, via DL6, exact localization and external location would coin-
cide, which is absurd.) So again x and r(x) would be connected, non-over-
lapping, and non-abutting. But now we would have an account of each of
these notions. Ergo, we would after all have an account of the relation be-
tween x and r(x)—and that is purely mereotopological.
Again, the argument is intriguing, but it fails to establish the purported
conclusion. What follows, really, is that localization can be expl i ed in
terms of C, P, and r. But of course we know that regions are essentially
linked to localization. The region of x is the region at which x is located
(DL5), and x is located at its regions and nothing else (TL33). So, assuming
r is tantamount to assuming L, really, and the limits of mereotopology show
up again. (This is in fact the reason why, on the standard interpretation of
‘C’, an equivalence such as TL58 does not amount to a characterization of
localization in topological terms: reference to ‘R’ plays a crucial role in the
right-hand side of the biconditional, and ‘R’ is defined via ‘L’.)
One final point is in order. It is clear that on this extended interpretation
of ‘C’, mereology and topology would also retain an independent status.
For on the one hand, C would be a proper extension of O by assumption.
On the other, with TL56 strenghtened to a biconditional, everything con-
nected to an entity x would be connected to its region r(x), and yet the for-
mer would not be part of the latter. (Likewise, if a stone is inside a hole,
then everything connected to the stone would be connected to the hole, but
the stone would not be part of the hole. Its region is part of the region of the
hole, but that is all.) Going back now to the standard interpretation of ‘C’
employed here, the situation is significantly different. If connection is really
only a matter of overlap or abutting, then the stone and the hole are arguably
disconnected. But what about the stone and its region? And what about
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other cases of (partial) co-localization—for instance, what about the rotating
and the cooling down of the Earth, are they connected? Is there a sharing of
boundaries there? If the answer is no in all cases, then an important conse-
quence follows. For then we have no more c unterexamples to the re-
ducibility of parthood to connection. In other words, there are no pairs of
entities x and y such that x is not part of y even though everything connected
with x is connected with y. Accordingly, the r striction R(x) could be
dropped from the consequent of AL13, and the reduction of mereology to
topology would be complete (as work in the tradition of Whitehead has sug-
gested). Thus, although we started from mereology, in the end we would be
left with a topology-based theory of localization. If, on the other hand, we
leave open the possibility that at least some such cases of co-localization in-
volve boundary-sharing (if not overlap), then the reduction falls short, and
the final picture is truly three-fold: we need topology, we need localization,
and we need mereology. Which of these accounts is correct is perhaps a
matter of stipulation. We prefer the open choice, and consequently the three-
fold picture.
ON SHARING AN ADDRESS
We have been dealing so far with localization understood as a relation be-
tween an object and a region of space. But we can also refer to the notions
introduced above to express the fundamental ways in which two objects can
be related to each other in terms of localization. Thus, for every L-relation
S L, with S  =  W, P, G, E, IC, IP, TC, or TP, define the corresponding re-
lation of region-location:
DL11 RS L(x,  y) =df S L(x, r(y)).
As the following equivalences show, any relation thus defined is equivalent
to a relation expressible via P, C, and r (compare TL45–TL48 and the obvi-
ous topological analogues):
TL59 RWL(x,  y) « P(r(x), r(y))
TL60 RPL(x,  y) « P(r(y), r(x))
TL61 RGL(x,  y) « O(r(x), r(y))
TL62 REL(x,  y) « EC(r(x), r(y))
TL63 RTWL(x,  y) « TP(r(x), r(y))
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TL64 RTPL(x,  y) « TP(r(y), r(x))
TL65 RIWL(x,  y) « IP(r(x), r(y))
TL66 RIPL(x,  y) « IP(r(y), r(x)).
But on the face of it, DL11 represents a fundamental key for extending the
theory of localization developed so far. For it makes it possible to relax the
constraint that localization is essentially a relation between objects and re-
gions. By DL11, we can speak of an object being wholly, partly, or generi-
cally located at/with another object, and likewise for the other relations. (We
can say, for instance, that John is internally wholly region-located (RIWL)
in his godfather’s country house.)
Now, one more relation that can be defined along these lines is exact
co-localization, which so far we have been using intuitively. This is ob-
tained by just dropping the modifier ‘S ’ from DL11:
DL12 RL(x, y) =df L(x, r(y)).
The link with TL59–TL66 is given by the fact that sameness of localization
amounts to identity of corresponding regions:
TL67 RL(x, y) « r(x)=r(y).
This is in itself an interesting notion, and rather well-behaved:
TL68 RL(x, x)
TL69 RL(x, y) ®  RL(y, x)
TL70 RL(x, y) Ù  RL(y, z) ®  RL(x, z).
That is, RL is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive (an equivalence relation).
Moreover, we immediately have the analogues of DL1–DL3:
TL71 RWL(x, y) « $ z(P(z, y) Ù  RL(x, z))
TL72 RPL(x, y) « $ z(P(z, x) Ù  RL(z, y))
TL73 RGL(x, y) « $ z$ w(P(z, x) Ù  P(w, y) Ù  RL(z, w))
as well as of AL2–AL3:
TL74 RL(x, y) Ù  P(z, x) ®  WL(z, y))
TL75 RL(x, y) Ù  P(z, y) ®  PL(x, z)).
(Likewise for the analogues of the topological extensions in DL6–DL10 and
AL9–AL12.) This is as it should be. If the statue is co-located with th
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bronze, then the head of the statue is wholly located within the (region of
the) whole bronze, and the whole statue is partly located at the (region of
the) bronze of the head. This is not enough, though. For we also want to
say that the sum consisting of the statue and he bronze is co-located with
the statue, and also with the bronze. This cannot follow from the available
axioms for L, which are consistent with the possibility that the sum of two
co-located objects have a different localization than the objects themselves.
To rule this out, we therefore need an additional axiom:
AL14 $ x(f x) Ù  " x(f x ®  L(x, y)) ®  L(s x(f x), y).
This is a sort of summing principle to the effect that fusion of any number of
entities that are located at a region y is also located at y. (Exercise: how is
this related to AL5'?) This is obvious if we want L to be strong enough to
support the full strength of the underlying mereological structure: if the sum
of two things is nothing over and above the two things (the sum is thos
things, as David Lewis [1991:81] put it), then its behavior with respect to
localization cannot run afoul of the behavior of its constituent objects. If a
statue and the bronze it is made of are located at the same region, then so is
their mereological sum. Given this, we immediately obtain the desired prop-
erty of RL:
TL76 $ x(f x) Ù  " x(f x ®  RL(x, y)) ®  RL(s x(f x), y)
TL77 $ y(f y) Ù  " y(f y ®  RL(x, y)) ®  RL(x, s y(f y)).
An important consequence is that something may be co-located with
some of its proper parts. Thus, co-localization falls short of identity, as we
well know. In this respect, it is rather like the relation of coincidence used
for instance by Brentano in his account of boundaries: boundaries are lo-
cated in space but do not ccupy space, and can therefore be perfectly co-lo-
cated with one another 4. However, there is an important difference here.
Boundaries do not occupy space insofar as they do not take up space—they
are lower-dimensional spatial entities. Here, in contrast, we are interested in
a general feature of spatial localization, namely, that more entities can share
the same address, and this feature applies to all sorts of entities regardless of
their dimensionality. Every spatial entity has an address; but to have an ad-
dress does not mean to be the exclusive owner of it.
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OWNING AN ADDRESS
Take again definition DL4, and the axiom that justifies it, AL4: spatial re-
gions are those entities that are located at themselves. Thus, there is always
something located at a region. Thus, regions are never empty.
“Full” as space may be in this sense, the possibility remains that some
(or even all) spatial regions be empty in the ordinary sense. Consider then
the alternative: space is full in the stronger sense that, for every region y,
something else than y is located there. We may state this in the form of an
axiom as follows:
AL15 R(y) ®  $ x(x¹ y Ù  L(x, y)).
This would support the claim that localization supplies a means for picking
out regions of space. Or, somewhat more emphatically, it would be in
agreement with the view that the individuation of spatial regions is parasitic
upon the individuation of the objects located at them—a view advocated by
Strawson [1959] among others. But would AL15 really give us a full space
in the ordinary sense? And under what interpretation?
Note that, by AL1 and AL4, the entity x located at region y in AL15
cannot be a region itself: it must be something of a different kind—some-
thing that cannot occur as a value for the second argument of the L relation.
So, one intuition of the ordinary notion of fullness is captured by the pro-
posed axiom, namely that filling up space involves something else than just
space. However, to adequately capture the ordinary notion, we must also
clarify the relationship between filling up a region of space (occupying it, as
we may also say) and simply being located at it. Every entity x is exac ly lo-
cated at exactly one region, its region r(x). But we know that the converse
need not hold: different entities may share the same exact location. Material
objects seem to have the property of excluding other material objects from
the region they are located at. For them, localization is exclusive—they oc-
cupy the regions where they are located (the relationship with their regions
is one-one). But we saw that this need not hold for all entities. Events, for
instance, do not prevent other entities from sharing the same region (a fact
attesting the inadequacy of any attempt to use co-localization as a criterion
for event identity just as for object identity, as Davidson pointed out in sev-
eral occasions 5). Thus, the distinction between localization and occupation
is not without content. And if we take “fullness” to imply spatial occupation
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rather than mere localization, then AL15 needs some adjustment by replac-
ing ‘L’ with a suitable predicate ‘OC’ expressing spatial occu on.
As a tentative step, we may exploit the foregoing suggestion and define
this notion of occupation as exclusive localization:
DL13 OC(x, y) =df L(x, y) Ù  " z(L(z, y) ®  z=x),
or, by exploiting the notion of co-localization (RL):
DL13' OC(x, y) =df L(x, y) Ù  " z(RL(z, x) ®  z=x).
This is defective in several ways, though. For one thing, we know that L is
reflexive on spatial regions (and RL refexive simpliciter), so in general we
would have to insert in the first conjunct of these definitions the proviso that
x¹ y, and in the antecedent of the second conjunct the proviso that z¹ y. In-
deed, in view of AL14, we would actually need the provisos that Ø O(x, y)
and Ø O(z, y). Secondly, also the consequent of the second conjunct is to be
strengthened to an overlap proviso, i.e., O(z x). Otherwise nothing would
occupy anything. (Suppose x is John and z the sum of John with the event
of his being there: the two are co-located and distinct, and yet we want to
say that John truly occupies r(John).) Thirdly, and more generally, DL13–
DL13' fail to fix a suitable range for the quantified variable z. To draw from
a suggestion by David Wiggins [1968: 93], no two things of the same kind
can be located in the same place at the same time (Wiggins uses ‘occupy’ in
the sense of our ‘located’); but a statue and the bronze it is made of may
very well be exactly coincident in space, at least for some portions of their
respective lives. Hence, exclusive localization (dismissing only regions of
space) is too strict a condition for any interesting notion of occupation—the
notion whereby material objects do, and events do not, occupy the space at
which they are located. What we need is a relative notion, which captures
the sortal nature of Wiggins’s criterion. And the natural solution is to use a
definition schema. Where f  is any condition, we may say that an object f -
occupies a certain region if and only if it is the only f -er that is located at that
region. Taking all of this into account, we arrive at the following:
DL13" OCf  (x, y) =df L(x, y) Ù  f x Ù  " z(L(z, y) Ù  f z ®  O(z, x)),
which immediately implies:
TL78 OCf  (x, y) Ù  OCf  (z, y) ®  z=x.
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Together, DL13" and TL78 provide the desired characterization of the dis-
tinguishing feature of occupation versus localization, at least within the lim-
its set above.
Of course, being defined in terms of exact localization, spatial occu-
pancy is in fact exact spatial occupancy. A chair occupies exactly the region
of space at which it is exactly located. Weaker notions of occupancy can
then be defined matching the weaker notions of localization defined above
(DL1–DL3 and DL6–DL10), but we need not go into these routine details.
Suffice it to remark that there is a slight asymmetry in this regard, as local-
ization and occupation have opposite part–whole structures. Something x is
partly located at a region y f some part of x is located at y; but if this part
actually occupies y (relative to some relevant condition f ), we would rather
say that x wholly occupies y; by contrast, x partly occupies y if x occupies
only part of y, in which case we rather say that x is wholly located at y.
Thus, the correct analogues of DL1–DL2 for occupation are:
DL14 WOCf  (x, y) =df $ z(P(z, x) Ù  OCf  (z, y))
DL15 POCf  (x, y) =df $ z(P(z, y) Ù  OCf  (x, z)),
which in turn imply:
TL79 WOCf  (x, y) ® PL(x, y)
TL80 POCf  (x, y)) ® WL(x, y) .
There is a deeper asymmetry between occupation and localization in
this connection. Occupation is first and foremost exact occupation: to un-
derstand what it is for something to occupy a region requires in an essential
way the capacity to compare the respective shapes and dimensions of the
occupying thing and of the occupied reg on. By contrast, to understand
what it is for a certain thing to be located at a certain region requires the
competence for somebody to find a place (an actual address) for that thing,
but we have seen at the beginning that this leaves room for some flexibility
as to the actual extension of the relevant place. We can distinguish a minimal
and a non-minimal address, with all the intermediate degrees allowed by this
contraposition. The notions of whole, partial, generic, but also tangent, in-
ternal, external localization are meant to capture the variety of ensuing plau-
sible relations; yet some of the corresponding notions of occupation would
hardly enjoy any plausibility, except from a purely algebraic perspective.
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What would it be for something to internally occupy a region of space? And
to externally occupy one?
With these provisos, two further facts about the notion of occupation
characterized by DL13" and TL78 are worth noting. First, if f  is the prop-
erty of being a region (R), then every region is actually such as to f -occupy
itself (by AL1):
TL81 OCR (x, x).
This may be regarded as a case of sui generis occupation, for spatial regions
can hardly be said to occupy anything. But the connection with material
objects is not uninteresting: objects cannot share an address with other
objects; regions cannot be located at other regions. This is also expressed by
the following:
TL82 OCR (x, y) ®  x=y,
whence we immediately infer that OCR is both symmetric and anti-sym-
metric, and collapses to identity.
The second fact concerns the relationship between occupation and the
notion of full space. As we saw, the requirement that every region be the
region of something (AL15) does not capture this notion, for the relevant
concept of “fullness” involves something more than mere localization—it
requires occupation. However, now we see that occupation is not an abso-
lute notion, as it crucially depends on the discriminating condition f . This
means that the strengthening of AL15 can take the following form
AL15' R(y) ®  $ x(x¹ y Ù  OCf  (x, y)),
where the choice of a suitable f  is still in need of further qualification. For
instance, we can take f  to be the property of being a material object, or a
part thereof. But this means that the fullness of space goes beyond the con-
fines of a theory of space—it requires a theory of objects in the first place.
(Observe incidentally that Wiggins’ principle is not self-evidently a neces-
sary truth. We may take TL78 as a sort of extensionality principle apt for the
characterization of material objects. Yet nothing in theory rules out the pos-
sibility that two—or, for that matter, infinitely many—distinct indistin-
guishable material objects be perfectly co-located. If occupation is exclusive
localization, relative to things of a kind, then material objects are illustrious
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candidates to the role of spatial occupants. But it is not the task of a theory
of localization to determine whether such entities are actually such as to oc-
cupy space. Nor should the theory be concerned with the task of explaining
why material objects occupy space, if they do, and why they are therefore
impenetrable by other material objects—as discussed for instance by Locke,
Essay, II, iv, and commented upon by Leibniz.)  
ROOMMATES
We have seen that occupation implies localization, but not vice versa. And
we suggested that this distinction is not without content, that over and above
regions of space several other kinds of entities may be alleged as plausible
“roommates” sharing one and the same address. Now, we still need to take
a closer look at what patterns of co-localization can be distinguished. For
surely enough, if occupation is not an absolute notion, neither is co-local-
ization.
We have, for instance, the case of categorially non-homogeneous
roommates, as illustrated by Wiggins’ opposition between a statue and the
bronze it is made of, or by Locke’s original example of a living organism
and its constituent mass of matter. And we have homogeneous roomates of
lower dimensionality, as illustrated by Brentano’s view on surfaces and
other boundary-like entities: such entitities are located in space but do not
take up any space, and can therefore be exactly co-located with one another.
(We skip over the ontological intricacies involved in the notion of a bound-
ary, which of course tie in with the general question of whether spatial re-
gions should include lower-dimensional elements as well—points, lines,
planes.6) Moreover, we have at least two further cases of full-fledged ho-
mogeneus roommates, entities that seem to truly escape Wiggins’ restriction
that entities of the same kind cannot be co-located. On the one hand, we
have events, as with the Davidsonian example of the rotation of the Earth
and its cooling down 7. Some authors, for instance Hacker [1982], have
actually suggested this as a primary distinguishing feature of events in com-
parison to objects: the latter, but not the former, occupy the space at which
they are located. On the other hand, we have various sorts of immaterial or
otherwise ethereal—yet genuinely spatial—entities. Thus, for instance, in
his commentary of Locke, Leibniz suggested that two shadows or two rays
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of light may interpenetrate (New Essays, II-xxvii-1). J. M. Shorter [1977]
envisaged the intriguing example of two intersecting clouds produced by
two distinct “cloud projectors”. David Lewis [1991: 75] has two angels
dancing forever on the head of a pin (two totally distinct and yet perfectly
co-located proper parts of the “total angelic content” of their shared region).
And we suggested considering holes: we saw that holes can be interpene-
trated by other things, as when you put a stone in the middle of a doughnut;
but holes can also be interpenetrated by other holes, i.e., things of the very
same kind, as when you put a chunk of Gruyère with a small hole inside a
bigger hole in a bigger piece of Emmenthaler. The former hole does not be-
come part of the latter. Rather, it is partly co-located with it, i.e., exactly co-
located with a part of it 8. (It is RWL-located in the second hole, in the ter-
minology of DL11.)
We thus have at least four distinct reasons for speaking of roommates,
depending on the sort of entities that we consider. The first two cases are
relatively uninteresting. Categorially heterogeneous entities need not com-
pete for localization. And lower-dimensional entities cannot properly com-
pete: if they don’t take up any space, how could they claim any real spatial
estate? (An exception might be geographical entities, such as regional or na-
tional territories; but the sort of competition involved in occupying this sort
of two-dimensional entities is not of our concern.) The third and fourth case
provide clearer cases of full-fledged, categorially homogeneous entities that
can share an address with their peers. Yet again we must distinguish. In the
case of events, the reason seems to lie in their somewhat difficult relation-
ship with space. We said that occupation is first and foremost exact occupa-
tion. But events can hardly be said to be spatially located, let alone exactly
located. Davidson, and after him Lombard [1986], have suggested that an
event’s exact location is the location of the minimal part of the event, i.e., of
the part occupied by the minimal participant of the event. (At each instant of
time, the exact location of John’s rising of his arm is the spatial region oc-
cupied by John’s arm.) Since the same participant, or the same part of a par-
ticipant, can be involved in more than one event at the same time, events
cannot on this account occupy the space where they occur. On the other
hand, Hacker—and before him Quinton [1979]—have objected that the
question ‘Where did . . . happen?’ is rarely a question about a minimal area
in this sense, and may actually be meaningless for various classes of events
(e.g., for most social events or purely relational changes). If so, then events
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would simply run afoul of our account of localization in terms of minimal
addresses: in the case of objects everything can be reduced to a matter of ex-
act localization, but when it comes to events, the only applicable notion is
that of generic, non-minimal localization—and this provides no grounds for
occupation. No matter how we look at it, the possibility for events to share
their place of occurrence with other events seems to be a natural conse-
quence of their loose spatial nature, and only vanishes with one’s willing-
ness to reify them and assimilate events to material objects.
Holes are quite a different story (and likewise for shadows, light rays,
clouds, and perhaps even angels). Their relation to space is much more
definite, as is their relation to material objects. Like material objects, holes
have clear spatiotemporal properties, such as shape, size, and duration (so
much so that an author like David Armstrong [1968: 282] used holes against
the thesis that primary qualities are definitory of material objects). Yet holes
are obviously not material objects, for they lack any material consistency.
And they are not regions of space either; for holes can move, as happens
anytime you move a piece of Swiss cheese, whereas regions cannot. Holes
are, so to speak, halfway between objects and regions. They are reified
spatial regions: they can change position without losing their identity; but
they are not sufficiently reified to prevent other things (including other
holes) to share their address. Holes do not occupy space because they are
spacious, they are made of space, and share with space its most distinguish-
ing feature—interpenetrability.
PATTERNS OF LOCALIZATION
By way of conclusion, recall then our initial stipulation: localization is a re-
lation between spatial entities of whatever sort (as first term) and spatial re-
gions (as second term). This is a convenient simplification, and it allows us
to pinpoint some major structures of localization. But we might want to al-
low the second term to also range over other entities than just regions. After
all, the interpenetrability of holes is paradigmatic of an important pattern of
spatial localization that runs afoul precisely of this restriction—containment.
In many cases, to be contained in an object is to be located (wholly or par-
tly) in a hole of that object. And to be located in an object’s hole is to be lo-
cated outside the object, at a region disjoint from the object’s region.
THE STRUCTURE OF SPATIAL LOCALIZATION
29
There are two distinct issues here. On the one hand, we may want to
speak of an object being located in another object. We have already seen that
such an account can be covered by the theory of localization outlined above
via the system of relations defined in DL11 and DL12. The stone is located
in the hole because it is located at the hole’s region. On the other hand, the
interesting extension of the theory involves allowing things to be located at
other things without there being any corresponding relationship between
their respective regions. The stone is in the bowl, but there is no connection
between the stone’s region and the bowl’s. And a worm can be inside a
piece of cheese without there being any connection between the region of the
worm and that of the c ese: the worm lies outside the cheese, strictly
speaking, and yet it is located inside it. Indeed this is generally to be ex-
pected given the constraints on spatial occupancy: if x and y are both mate-
rial objects—or, more generally, objects that occupy their spatial regions—
then the regions they occupy must be discrete unless the object themselves
overlap. In this second case, there seems to be no straightforward bridge
from L to the extended relation of localization, call it ‘LOC’.
Now, there is no doubt that the general features of this extended rela-
tion are to be investigated for the purpose of a general picture of localization.
We may still want to draw a bridge between LOC and L by exploiting the
idea that the peculiar cases of LOC are akin to containment, and containment
is typically a case of localization-in-a-hole. This would suggest setting:
DL16 LOC(x, y) =df RL(x, y) Ú $ z (H(z, y) Ù  RL(x, z)),
or, more generally:
DL17 S LOC(x, y) =df RS L(x, y) Ú  $ z (H(z, y) Ù  RS L(x, z)),
where ‘H’ is the hole in relation and ‘S ’ picks out the relevant patterns of
localization as in DL11 (i.e., S  =  W, P, G, etc.). But of course this is only
good within certain limits and for certain approximations. For one thing, we
need a whole theory of holes (and of the hole–host interaction) to support
the interpretation of ‘H’. And, secondly, not every peculiar case of LOC is
reducible to localization-in-a-hole, no matter how flexible we remain with
respect to the relevant notion of hole (we might want to say that the contain-
ing part of the bowl is a hole in the bowl, for instance, at least for the pre-
sent purposes). In some cases, hole localization is simply not a sufficient
condition for the intended interpretation of LOC: a worm in a hole of the
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cheese is a worm in the cheese, but a fly in a hole in the bowl (a small per-
foration in the bottom, for instance, not the main containing hollow) is not a
fly in the bowl. Or, to use a related example from Vandeloise [1994: 173],
the bulb is in the socket, but the bottle is not in the cap—or so one could ar-
gue. In other cases, localization in a hole falls short of being a necessary
condition for LOC: the flowers are in John’s hands, but there is no hole in-
volved here unless we stipulate otherwise.
We may thus want to say that extending L to a broader notion involves
abandoning the geometrical structure of localization, or at least leaving it
open. Spatial localization as explained by the family of L-relations is but one
major pattern of localization, and extending it along the lines of DL16–DL17
is only a minor step ahead. The variety of interesting patterns is presumably
much wider, and appears to be a rewarding subject for further independent
exploration.9
NOTES
1For a general overview of extensional mereology, as well as of its tensed and
modal extensions, we refer to Simons [1987].
2There is no such thing as the tandard mereotopology, but a variety of theories
mostly inspired to Whitehead’s account in [1929]. See inter alia Clarke [1981, 1985];
Randell & Cohn [1989]; Randell et al., [1992a, 1992b]; Smith [1993]. For our purposes,
however, we need not go into any detailed examination of the available variants. For a
first appraisal, see Eschenbach & Heydrich [1993] and Varzi [1994].
3This is the interpretation that we employed in Casati & Varzi [1994] (Appendix);
see also Varzi [1993].
4Brentano [1976]; compare Chisholm [1992/93]. In fact, it is interesting to observe
that recent axiomatic treatments of Brentano’s theory of coincidence are based on
postulates comparable to our TL68–TL70, TL74 and TL77. See e.g. Smith [1995a,
1995b].
5See e.g. Davidson [1969]; the idea that two distinct events cannot exactly share the
same spatiotemporal region has been put forward among others by Quine [1950] and Lem-
mon [1967].
6For some thoughts on this we refer to Varzi [1996].
7Of course, a different analysis of event identity might deny that the rotation and the
cooling down of the Earth are two distinct events. This is precisely the view of Quine and
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Lemmon referred to in note 5.
8We discuss this in Casati and Varzi [1994], ch. 7. Chisholm [1973:590] also con-
siders shadows and holes as counterexamples to the Locke–Wiggins principle.
9Many thanks to Peter Simons and Barry Smith for their comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
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